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A RG EN TIN E REPU BLIC v . AM ERADA H ESS
--

U.S .

109 S .Ct . 683, 10 2 L .Ed 2d 818
23 Jan uary 1989

----.

A fe deral co urt doe s not have j ur isdict ion over a fore ign sovere ign that attac ks a ne utral sh ip in inte rnat ional water s
unle ss the cla im is w ith in the except ion s en umerate d by the Fore ign Sovere ign Imm un it ie s Act .
FAC TS: United Carriers, Inc. !United!, a Liberian corporation,
chartered the oil tanker Hercules to Amerada Hess Shipping
Corporation (Hess!, also a Liberian corporation, to transport
crude oil from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in Alaska to the Hess
Refinery in the United States Virgin Islands.
On May 25, 1982, after completing delivery to the Virgin
Islands, Hercules began the return voyage to Alaska, her tanks
empty except for her fuel. At this time, Great Britain and
Argentina were at war over the Falkland Islands.
To insure the safety of neutral shipping, the United States, on
June 3, 1982, informed the two hostile nations of the location of
all U nited States vessels and Liberian tankers owned by United
States interests and traveling in the South Atlantic including
the position of Hercules. Five days later, while in international
waters, the Hercules was attacked by Argentine aircraft 600
nautical miles from Argentina and 500 miles !rom the Falklands,
well outside the war zone designated by both countries.
The damaged Hercules headed toward Rio DeJaniero under
her own power, where, upon arrival, the Brazilian Navy de
termined that an undetonated bomb remamed lodged in the
ship and, concluding it was too dangerous to remove it, scuttled
the ship 250 miles off the coast of Brazil.
United brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking damages of� LO million
dollars due to the loss of the ship. Hess sought damages of $1.9
million dollars for its fuel. Jurisdiction was pr{'mised upon
violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATSI, 28 l .S.C. �1350.
which grants original jurisdiction to the district courts for tort
actions by aliens who violate a treaty of the United States or the
"'law of nations", as well as the general admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1333, and the ··principle of universal

jurisdiction" undei� internationalla'Vv·.

The district court held that both complaints were barred by the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act t FSIA1 and therealter dis
missed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 683 F.Supp.
73 (S.D.N.Y. 1976!. The Second Circuit reverst·d, 830 F.2d 421
12d Cir. 1987 I, ruling that the lower court has junsd1ction under
the ATS because the action sounded in tort tship bombed with
out justification! and violated international law 1 unJustilied

and unprovoked in international waters). The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Whether the ATS, the general maritime jurisdiction
of§1333 or the universal jurisdiction of international law grants
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign who attacks a neutral ship
traveling in international waters engaged in United States
domestic trade?
ISSU E:

The Federal Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S. C. §1604 is the sole basis for granting jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign under the above circumstances. The ATS is no
longer applicable to jurisdiction. The text and structure of the
FSIA demonstrates Congress' intention that a foreign state
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts in the United
States except as provided in §§1605-1607 of the Act. The FSIA
·· must be applied by the district courtlsl in every action against
a foreign sovereign, since subject-matter jurisdiction in any
such action depends on the existence of one of the specified
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity." Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank ofNigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983>.
The Second Circuit acknowledged the "general rule" that the
Act governs the immunity of foreign states in federal court, 830
F . 2d at 426, but reasoned that the FSIA's commercial focus
combined with Congress' failure to repeal the ATS indicated that
Congress intended to allow federal courts to continue to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign states in suits alleging violations of
international law outside the confines of FSIA.
The Supreme Court noted that the lack of pro tanto repeal by
Congress of the ATS when the FSIA was passed in 1976 may be
explained by the uncertainty as to whether the ATS conferred
jurisdiction in suits against foreign states. Furthermore, the
language of§1602 clearly states that "claims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States in conformity with the principals set forth in this chapter"
I emphasis added!. A reflection of Congress' intent, this language
precludes jurisdiction premised on the ATS in the instant suit. The
Court also noted that the FSIA statutory scheme is comprehensive;

ANALYSIS:

(Continued ... )

Ar gentine Rep ublic v. Amera da He ss (Cont.)

the Court doubted that "even the most meticulous draftsman
would have concluded that Congress also needed to amend pro
tanto the Alien Tort Statute and presumably such other grants
of subject matter jurisdiction in Title 28....
Congress provided for admiralty jurisdiction in federal court
when it enacted the FSIA. Contained within the statute are
exceptions to immunity, which include waiver, §1605 Ia); com
mercial activities occurring within or directly affecting the United
States, §1605 (a)(2); property expropriated in violation of inter
national law §1605 (a)(3); certain property within the United
States§1605 (a)(4); non-commercial torts occurring in the United
"

States § 1605 laH5 ); and maritime liens against vessels and/or
cargo §1605 lbl. But, due to the statute's comprehensive and
preemptive nature, unless the case falls within one of the excep
tions listed, the statute does not authorize the bringing of an
action. The Court agreed with the district court that none of the
exceptions applied.
The Court's ruling establishes that the FSIA provides the sole
basis for granting jurisdiction over a foreign state in United
States courts and the district court correctly dismissed the action
because the FSIA did not authorize jurisdiction over Argentina
under the facts of this case.
Patr ic ia M. D'Ora zio '90

AND REW G. BLACK v. RED STA R TOWING & T RANSPO RTATION CO., INC . v. MO BIL OIL CO RP.
U nited S tate s Co urt of Appeal s, Secon dC irc uit, 17 October 1988
860 F. 2d 30 (en ban e)
A fter 60 year s, "The Fe deral No. 2" ha s little sa lva ge va lue . A c la im a ga in st a th ir d party for a proportionate share of
maintenance an dc ure i s nothin gmore than a claim for contr ib ut ion un der well- settle da dmira lty pr inciple s.

man·s rights to maintenance and cure which arise under a
contractual relationship between an employer and employee.
Following this rationale, the court in The Federal No. 2 had
denied recovery by a shipowner for expenses voluntarily paid to
an injured seaman for maintenance and cure. This policy has
been followed to insure the unqualified right of an injured
seaman, to the prompt payment of maintenance and cure, with
out delay of third-party actions. See Aguilar v.Standard Oil
Co., 318 U.S. 724, 730 I 1943). This benefit did not preclude a
seaman from recovering directly from the primary third-party
tortfeasor for injuries sustained. However, when the seaman
sued both the third-party and the shipowner jointly, the ship
owner remained responsible for maintenance and cure to the
extent of the third-party's failure to pay.SeeSeelyv.Cityo{New
York, 24 F.2d 412 i2d Cir. 1930).
In reviewing the handling of this issue in other circuits, this
court examined the Third Circuit's application of state common
Ia w in favor of the doctrine of indemnification and/or contribu
tion by third parties under the theory that a seaman-shipowner
relationship does give rise to a "social condition" deserving of
the right of contribution. See Jones v. Waterman Steamship
Corp. Inc., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946). The Fifth Circuit rejected
the holding of The Federal No. 2, and held that an innocent
shipowner was entitled to indemnification from a third-party
tort-feasor for expenses incurred in the payment of maintenance
and cure. See Savoie v. LaFourche Boat Rentals Inc., 627 F.2d
722, 723 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Ninth Circuit allowed third-party actions for indemnification
based on the contractual relationship that existed between the
shipowner and the third-party which gives rise to the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance. See Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In the
instant matter, however, the court found that this single trans
action did not give rise to a contractual relationship and there
fore, Red Star's theory of a breach of the implied warranties did
not apply.
In reviewing the equity of an innocent shipowner bearing the
full burden of maintenance and cure, the United States Court of
Appeals concluded that a claim by a shipowner against a third
party tortfeasor was little more than a "claim for contribution
under well-settled admiralty principles." See Adams v. Texaco,
Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1981). In balancing the equities,
this court held that such claim for reimbursement could be
brought by an independent action, a third-party action, or a
cross-claim, but only to the extent of that third-party's proportion
ate share of the damages. The court reversed and remanded this
matter to the district court, with instruction to enter judgment
in favor of Red Star in an amount equal to Mobil's proportionate
share of the maintenance and cure paid by Red Star.

FACTS: On February 27, 1985, plaintiff, Andrew G. Black
I Black) a marine engineer employed by Red Star Towing and
Transportation Co., Inc. (Red Star! was responsible for arranging
to purchase oil and transfer it to Red Star's tug Crudaser. While

the tug was tied to a dock owned by Mobil Oil Corporation
(Mobill, a deckhand placed a wooden ladder on the tug·s deck to
facilitate access from the tug's deck to the pier above. Black, in
the course of his employment, and discharging his responsibili
ties, ascended and descended the ladder on several occasions. At
the jury trial, Black testified that "the ladder . .. seemledl to be
wobbly" because of high winds and choppy seas.
Due to Black's concern with the wooden ladder, he began to use
a steel ladder which was affixed to Mobil's dock. On Black's
second descent, the left side of the ladder's rungs gave way
causing Black to drop onto the broken rung, resulting in the
broken rung becoming imbedded in his buttocks. Black
sustained various injuries, including severe contusions of the
sciatic nerve.
The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and only the
issues of liability and apportionment were presented to the jury
in the trial court. The jury found Black 90°k liable, Mobil 109'c
liable and O'k liability against Red Star.
In the post-trial motion, Red Star sought indemnity from Mobil
for the maintenance and cure paid to Black, plus attorney's fees
in the defense of this action. The district court denied Red Star's
motion recognizing the 60 year old doctrine of The Federal No.2,
21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927) that "a shipowner is not entitled to
indemnity for maintenance and cure from a negligent third party."
With respect to that part of the motion for attorney's fees, the
district court denied Red Star's application upon the failure to
show any "vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct on the part
of Mobil." In a summary order filed on December 4, 1987 by the
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, the district
court's order was affirmed, and Red Star's alternate argument,
based on a breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike
performance, was likewise rejected for lack of a substantial
relationship between the parties. Red Star made application for
a rehearing en bane for reconsideration.
ISSU E: Does a shipowner have a right of indemnity against a
third-party tortfeasor for maintenance and cure paid to an in
jured seaman?
ANALYSIS: In the United States Court of Appeals decision
overruling The Federal No.2, the court reviewed the analysis

between the social conditions which give rise for a parent to
recover monetary damages for expenses incurred in connection
with injuries sustained to her children, and the like doctrine for
spousal recovery under similar circumstances, to that of a sea-

Dorothy Phillips-Geller '91
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